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ABSTRACT
 
Once a vibrant symbol of the Los Angeles region, the
 
Pacific Electric Railway is popularly believed to have been
 
the victim of a conspiracy of automobile related industries
 
intent upon destroying all sources of competition. Examina
 
tion of the history of the region's electric trolley system,
 
however, exposes this theory as a myth. The author argues
 
that the streetcars disappeared because area residents
 
consistently demonstrated a preference for private automo
 
biles and the regulatory agency governing the trolleys
 
repeatedly made decisions which created an environment in
 
which rail-based mass transit could not compete.
 
Ill
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
 
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • V
 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
 
THE RED CARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • 3
 
UNION STATION CONTROVERSY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
 
DECLINING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
 
THE CONSPIRACY THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . v ♦ • v • •
 
EPILOGUE . . :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
 
APPENDIX A: SYMBOL OF LOS ANGELES . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
 
NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 57
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ♦ • 62
 
IV
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Effect of the Pacific Electric's Arrival 
on Population in Selected Cities . . . . . . . 8 
Table 2. Residents per Automobile . . . . 26 
-introdugtion
 
Pacific ElectriG (PE), also known as the "Red Cars"
 
for its distinctive red and orange color scheme, was an
 
important element of the Los Angeles Basin's transportation
 
system during the first haIf of the twentieth century. It
 
was not the first trolley system to serve Los Angeles, but
 
it was the most successful and enduring. Just as cable cars
 
are used to symbolize San Francisco, across the country the
 
appearance of the Red Cars in the background of a movie or
 
photograph immediately set the scene in Los Angeles. At its
 
height, the trolley's lines stretched from Santa Monica to
 
Redlands and from San Fernando to Orange County. The Pa
 
cific Electric was a simple part of Southern California life
 
for sixty years, but as most things do, it gradually lost
 
its utility over the years as area residents abandoned the
 
trolley in favor of the comfort and convenience of their
 
personal automobiles.
 
This paper will explore the history of the Pacific
 
Electric and, to a lesser extent, the Los Angeles Railway
 
(LARY) and will explain their roles and operations through
 
the first half of the century. The author will show how the
 
Pacific Electric grew from a tool to promote real estate
 
development to an extensive railway system offering passen
 
ger and freight services to the entire Los Angeles Basin,
 
and how it came to be a nationally recognized symbol of the
 
region. Also explained will be the trolleys' struggles to
 
survive against competition from autolnobiles and how public
 
policy decisions favoring increased access for automobiles
 
negatively affected trolley efficiency. Also addressed will
 
be the impact on the streetcar companies of the development
 
of multiple business districts in the communities surround
 
ing Los Angeles as well the disastrous effects of decisions
 
made by the California Public Utilities Commissioh,(CPUC) to
 
reject repeated requests for fare increases.
 
The popular idea that General Motors masterminded the
 
destruction of Los Angeles' streetcar system will be exam
 
ined and rejected. Instead, the author will show throughout
 
the study that decisions made locally by governing agencies
 
and private citizens were the fundamental cause of the
 
system's failure. Finally, we will see how rapid rail
 
transit has returried to Los Angeles, note some of the dif
 
ferences between the old and new systems, and explain why
 
the current system may have a better chance at long-term
 
success.
 
THE RED CARS
 
The Creation of the Pacific Electric
 
In 1901, Henry Edwards Huntlngton left an executive
 
position at the Southern PaGific in San Francisco to head
 
the newly incorporated Pacific Electric Railway, Huntlngton
 
was the nephew and part heir to Collis P. Huntington, the
 
railroad magnate who, along with Leland Stanford, Charles
 
Crocker and Mark Hopkins, headed up the Central Pacific
 
Railroad and built the western portion of the transcontinen
 
tal railroad in the 1860s. The Central Pacific later reor
 
ganized itself and several of its other railroads under the
 
Southern Pacific Railroad moniker in 1884 and Collis became
 
its president in 1890. Henry E. Huntington arrived in
 
California in 1892 to serve as his uncle's personal assis
 
tant, and by 1899 he had become a vice-president of the
 
railroad. After the death of his uncle in 1900, Henry left
 
the Southern Pacific and moved to Southern California to
 
oversee his personal business concerns.
 
Huntington purchased the Los Angeles Railway (LARY), an
 
intraurban electric trolley line, a couple of years before
 
the creation of the Pacific Electric, but the idea of devel
 
oping an entirely new, potentialiy profitable system from
 
the ground up "appealed to the builder in Huntington."^ He
 
envisioned an ambitious and prosperous future for his new
 
enterprise.
 
Huntington realized that his new railway system would
 
be extremely expensive both to construct and to operate and
 
decided that there was quicker gain in developing arid sell-'
 
ing the land close to the newly laid tracks. With this in
 
mind, he organized the Huntington Land and Improvement
 
Company soon after arriving in Los Angeles. While the
 
owners of preceding streetcar companies had recognized the
 
potential of developing land parcels adjoining their tracks,
 
Huntingtori's personal wealth made him unusually qualified to
 
take advantage of the opportunity.^ As he could provide the
 
capital necessary to construct the railway, he was able to
 
orchestrate the Construction of the lines to coincide with
 
the releases of his properties to the market. In the highly
 
competitive real estate market of the period, the availabil
 
ity of transportation in and out of the city gave Hunting­
ton's developments an edge over his competitors. Further
 
more, because he directed where the lines would go, he could
 
purchase inexpensively land which had been deemed undesir
 
able because of its distance from the city center, subdivide
 
it, provide it with water and power from his own utility
 
companies, construct a Pacific Electric line to service it,
 
and then sell the greatly improved properties for a nice
 
profit.^ His buyers benefitted from haying homes in quiet
 
communities far removed from the city but conveniently
 
connected to it by the Red Cars.
 
When compared to other interurbans the Pacific Electric
 
was also unique in that Huntington's immediate objective in
 
building the railway was not to make a profit from the
 
streetcar itself, but to use it to make his real estate
 
developments attractive and accessible to potential buyers.
 
In other words, the Pacific Electric was hot built with the
 
specific intent to connect existing communities with an
 
efficient method of transportation; its initial purpose was
 
to promote real estate sales.^ Only after it had served
 
that end was it expected to generate profit through its
 
operations. Interurbans in eastern cities, on the other
 
hand, were constructed to connect existing communities with
 
an efficient transportation system. They were built with
 
the explicit intent to transport people between two or more
 
communities.
 
The Los Angeles Railway, also owned by Huntington, had
 
a different function than the PE. LARY served those already
 
in the city as an intraurban transportation system providing
 
Los Angeles residents with a convenient method of traveling
 
about the city. Its cars traveled on tracks running down
 
the center of downtown streets, loading and unloading pas
 
sengers at stops in the middle of the street. Commuters
 
arrived in the city from newly developed Huntington proper
 
ties on the interurban Pacific Electric lines and trans
 
ferred onto LARY lines to get even closer to their final
 
destinations.
 
Trolley systems became popular nationwide because in
 
addition to providing a simple means of moving people, they
 
 permitted a city to expand gepgraphically as they allowed:
 
greater number of people to travel comfortably a longer
 
distance within the "accessibility radius!' (the distance one
 
could travel within a thirty to forty-five minute period) of
 
the city than they could When transportation was limited to
 
foot or horse.® In Southern California, the interurban had
 
an even greater impact oh the region•s deveiopment because
 
the population settled where its routes led.®
 
The Pacific Electric had a deep, long-lasting effect on
 
the Los Angeles Basin. It allowed average, working-class
 
people to move into the suburbs and was instrumental iri the
 
development of the Southland's distinctive, and early,
 
sprawling nature (what Crump calls the "City of Southern
 
California"' in which there is ho dominant central business
 
district and communities blend into each other until one
 
cannot tel1 where orie city begins and the other ends).
 
Huntington was so consistently successful in his real
 
estate projects that whenever he became involved in a devel
 
opment deal his actions were closely monitored by resource
 
ful entrepreneurs. In July 1905, for example, Huntington
 
announced the purchase of the Redondo Improvement Company
 
which owned 90% of the land in Redondo Beach a:s well as the
 
Los Angeles and Redondo Railway. This immediately triggered
 
a small laind boom in which a piece of phoperty would change
 
hands several times in a single day, each time being sold at
 
a higher price. The boom only lasted about two weeks but
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during that time, Huntington netted approximately three
 
million dollars.®
 
Huntington's methods met with repeated success. Wher
 
ever the Pacific EleGtric went, communities expanded and
 
thrived. The population growth of several cities during the
 
period of the Pacific Eleptric's arrival ia shown in
 
Table 1. Note how Burbank's population more than tripled
 
between 1900 and 1910 as the Pacific Electric arrived and
 
expanded its services between 1904 and 1911. Alhambra,
 
which didn't even exist in 1900, grew to more than 5,000
 
residents by 1910 after the Red Gars arrived in 1902.
 
Compare this rapid growth in Alhambra to the steady increase
 
in San Fernando where the PE did not arrive until 1911. The
 
Pacific Electric did not account for all the growth in all
 
of the cities, but it did make these communities more acces
 
sible and attractive to potential residents.
 
When he began constructing the Pacific Electric, Hun­
tington allowed for future growth whenever possible. Per
 
haps because of his experience with the Southern Pacific, he
 
decided to build the PE using standard gauge for the tracks
 
(4* 8%" across), although most other trolley systems used a
 
narrow gauge (3' 6"). By so doing, the Pacific Electric had
 
the ability to increase its profitability by utilizing
 
standard freight cars to engage in the freight trade.®
 
Entering the freight market, however, would mean that the
 
Pacific Electric would become an even greater competitive
 
TABLE 1
 
Effect of the Pacific Electric's Arrival
 
on Population in Selected Cities
 
PE
 
Towns/Area 1890 1900 1910 Arrives
 
—
Alhambra . . . . 5,021 1902
 
—
Azusa . . . . . . 863 1,477 1907
 
Burbank Township 2,996 3,048 12,255 1904-11
 
Glendale . . . . 2,746 1904
— —
 
■Huntington Beach 815 1904
 
Long Beach . . . 564 2,252 17,809 1902
 
Monrovia . . . . 907 1,205 3,576 1903
 
—
—
Newport Beach . . 445 1905
 
Pomona . . . . . 3,634 5,526 10,207 1909-12
 
Redondo Beach . . 603 855 2,935 1903"
 
San Fernando
 
Township . . . . 1,110 1,326 2,134 1911
 
San Gabriel
 
Township . . . . 1,713 2,501 8,550 1902
 
Santa Ana . . . . 3,628 4,933 8,429 1905
 
circa
 
Santa Monica . . 1,580 3,057 7,847 1896"
 
Whittier . . . . 585 1,590 4,550 1903
 
"Dates mark the arrival of a streetcar line but not the PE.
 
Source: Glenn Dumke, "The Growth of the Pacific Electric and
 
Its Influence upon the Development of Southern California to
 
1911" (M.A. thesis. Occidental College, 1939), p. l21, in
 
Henry E. Huntinaton and the Creation of Southern California,
 
William B. Friedricks, (Columbus: Ohio State University
 
Press, 1992), 154.
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threat to steam railroads such as the Southern Pacific:10
 
The advent of the electric interurban, which
 
made every car a train, created a dangerous
 
challenge to the steam railroads. Trolleys
 
could run frequently and economically stop at
 
the smallest communities. In an era when
 
competition from busses and automobiles was
 
not a reality electric interurban systems
 
were bringing reduced patronage to the steam
 
railroads they paralleled elsewhefe in the
 
nation.
 
The Pacific Electric's first major interurban route ran
 
from lios Angeles to Long Beach and was built on a private
 
right-of-way. Huntington preferred to construct private
 
routes even though they were more costly than running tracks
 
down the center of existing roadways. The private right-of­
ways allowed PE cars to travel swiftly with minimal inter
 
ference from cross traffic. They also had the added benefit
 
of being able to accommodate freight trains at odd hours of
 
the night with minimal disturbance of local residents.
 
Whenever practical, Huntington also constructed double
 
tracks so that the trolleys could travel efficiently and
 
unopposed at all hours of the day. Even when the immedi
 
ate expected volume of traffic on a particular line did not
 
require double-tracking, Huntington usually graded for it
 
during the initial construction phase so that the second set
 
jOf tracks could be easily laid as traffic did become heavy
 
enough.
 
Huntington's plans to expand the Pacific Electric's
 
freight business were never fully realized during the time
 
he controlled the company. Edward H. Harriman of the South­
9
 
 ern Pacific (SP) was aware of the competitive threat posed
 
by Huntington and the PaGific Electric to the operations of
 
his own company. He watched as Huntington ekpanded the
 
Pacific Electric's territory and goals, but as long as
 
Huntington focused on real estate development and the PE's
 
activities did not unnecessarily interfere with Southern
 
Pacific business, Harriman chose not to challehge Hunting­
ton. However, when the Pacific Electric's operations began
 
to encroach on the Southern Pacific's passenger service area
 
and to expand its freight service, Harriman responded to the
 
challenge.
 
In 1903 Harriiaan secured a fifty percent interest in
 
the PE and a forty-five percent interest in LARY on behalf
 
of the Southern Pacific^^ by purchasing shares from Hunting-'
 
ton's business partners who had begun to object to Hunting-

ton's insistence on putting LARY's and the PE's profits back
 
into the business instead of paying dividends. They had
 
invested in the railways to earn a profit, but although the
 
companies were doing well, they were not paying well.
 
Although Harriman did not obtain an actual controlling
 
interest in either of the companies, he was effectively able
 
to block most of Huntington's efforts to expand the PE's
 
freight business.
 
Huntington entertained hopes of expanding the Pacific
 
Electric's service all the way to San Diego, but Harriman
 
maneuvered to prevent him from going forward with those
 
■ 10- . 
plans. Thwarted at each attempt to branch out, Huntington
 
eventually realized that Harriman and the Southern Pacific
 
were not going to allow him to expand the Pacific Electric's
 
operations in any way that could negatively affect the
 
Southern Pacific's business. He soon began negotiations
 
with the SP to separate the ownership of LARY and the Pa
 
cific Electric so that an agreement could be reached in
 
which the Southern Pacific would obtain full interest in the
 
PE and Huntington would gain full interest in LARY.'^^
 
Negotiations were temporarily halted when Harriman died in
 
1909 but the deal was finally settled in November 1910.
 
Although LARY had a much smaller area of operation,
 
Huntington did not lose in the deal because LARY was actu
 
ally more profitable than the PE and required less of Hun
 
tington's personal attention to run. Ready to retire from
 
the railroad business, he now shifted his attention toward
 
more pleasurable pursuits. He began in earnest to amass a
 
collection of artwork and books which would eventually
 
become the basis of the Huntington Library on his estate in
 
San Marino, California.
 
With the Red Cars now under its control, the Southern
 
Pacific began to capitalize on Huntington's foresight by
 
using the PE routes and standard gauge trackage to augment
 
its own freight business. The business was so successful
 
that in 1911, the first year under Southern Pacific's con
 
trol, the Pacific Electric's freight revenue was $512,226,
 
11' ,
 
and in 1912 the amount more than doubled to reach
 
$1,203,956.^® The Southern Pacific continued to expand
 
passenger services on the system as well. By 1926 the
 
Pacific EleGtric had lines running as far east as Redlands,
 
Riverside, and Corona and stretched south to Santa Ana,
 
Orange, and Balboa and notth to San Fernando.
 
In addition to transportation for commuters, the Pa
 
cific Electric offered special excursiori trips. Pleasure
 
seekers who regularly ventured to their favorite beach
 
picnic areas in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, or Balboa cOuld
 
ride the Red Gars to the shore. There was an "Orange Empire
 
Trolley Trip" which involved a full day's excursion from Los
 
Angeles to Riverside for lunch and a tour of the Mission Inh
 
and then a ride up to San Bernardino and Redlands before
 
returning to Los Angeles. The most popular tour, however,
 
was the scenic ride up Mount Lowe north of Pasadena.
 
Developed by Professor Thaddeus Lowe, the Pasadena and
 
Mount Lowe Railway first opened to passenger travel in 1893
 
as a year-round mountain retreat> The trip was made in
 
stages of which the first and third stages were made in
 
standard electric trolleys winding their way up the side of
 
the mountain and offering spectacular vistas. The secOnd
 
stage, however, required passengers to break their trolley
 
ride and transfer to an "incline" car which had been devel
 
oped by Lowe and an engineer to achieve an elevation change
 
of more than 1200 feet in less than one-half mile. The
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special cars operated on a grade of approximately fifty-nine
 
percent" in a design now known as a funicular." Under
 
LoweV^ management there were dining and sleeping accommoda
 
tions at the end of each travel stage. However, by the time
 
the Southern Pacific acquired the line, only the Mount Lowe
 
Tavern at the end of the last, stage remained to offer pas
 
sengers the opportunity to rent a cottage for overnight or
 
more extended vacations.
 
Operations Under the Southern Pacific
 
The Southern Pacific continued to expand the Pacific
 
Electric's passenger services in the region as well as its
 
freight services. The SP further capitalized on the PE's
 
standard gauge trackage by using some of its lines as a
 
"switching network" for its own freight operations between
 
San Pedro's port facilities and Los Angeles.^®
 
The PE continued to service outlying communities and to
 
attract passengers by offering transportation to regional
 
special events. In 1912, for example, after service to
 
Pomona had begun, excursion cars were run directly to the
 
gates of the Los Angeles County fairgrounds. As soon as the
 
Pacific Electric reached San Bernardino in 1914, special
 
service was also provided to the National Orange Show
 
grounds.^®
 
By 1926 the Pacific Electric had reached as far east as
 
Redlands and as far south in the Inland Empire as Corona.
 
■ ■ 13-' 
The travel corridor between Pomona and San Bernardiho was
 
special to the PE system in several ways. It ran through a
 
rural area with comparatively fewer stops than on lines in
 
heavier populated areas nearer to Los Angeles. It operated
 
on a line which carried twice the voltage of the rest of the
 
system and whiGh made high speeds possible. More impor^
 
tantly, it had a protected right-of-way with very few cross
 
ings. As the motormen operating the trolleys did not have
 
to worry about cross-traffic, they could safely accelerate
 
to speeds of approximately sixty miles per hour, making the
 
San Bernardino line a true rapid transit provider.
 
Streetcars in the Spatial Development of the Los Angeles
 
Region
 
Los Angeles had, of course, existed prior to the intro
 
duction of electric streetcars, but, unlike Boston and New
 
York, it had never developed as a densely populated pedes
 
trian city. Furthermore, while interurbans existed and
 
thrived in other cities, they developed somewhat differently
 
in Los Angeles because interurban trolley developers in most
 
cities first had to raise funds through stock sales or
 
private subscriptions before any track could be laid and
 
then to build their lines between established towns and
 
cities. Huntington, on the other hand, used his trolleys as
 
a tool to attract custdmers^ His inheritance and the suc
 
cess of his real estate developments had provided him with
 
the financial wherewithal to purchase the right-of-ways he
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 needed, build a trolley line, and make it possible for
 
people to reach his properties in fledgling communities
 
around the Los Angeles Basin.
 
Even before Huntington built the Pacific Electric, Los
 
Angeles* transpprtation system had developed differently
 
than other urban areas had because, unlike most other Ameri
 
can cities, it had become an urban center during the Elec
 
tric Streetcar Era (1890-1920) rather than during the Walk-

ing/Horsecar Era (pre 1800-1890).^^ Cities which developed
 
during the Walking Era were small and densely populated out
 
of practical necessity because the primary means of trans
 
portation available to most inhabitants was walking. The
 
radius of the city could only expand out from the center to
 
a distance that could be comfortably walked in a thirty to
 
forty-five minute period. Anything larger made it impracti
 
cal for workers to travel from their homes to their
 
workplaces.
 
By the 1830s steam railroads made it possible for the
 
wealthy to move to the outskirts of the cities or to nearby
 
small towns from which they could commute into the city on a
 
daily basis. The majority of the population, however, could
 
not, afford to use the trains, so the limits of most cities
 
were not much affected by this particular technological
 
development. With the introduction of the horsecar, on the
 
other hand, thin suburban belts began to appear around the
 
cities* edges. When electric streetcars were introduced in
 
■ 15- '
 
the 1890s, the layout of the typical city changed from a
 
circular shape to a star pattern as homes and businesses
 
were built along the corridors formed by streetcar lines
 
radiating out from the city center. Because Los Angeles
 
had developed at the same time as the streetcar, its resi
 
dents were so dependent on the trolley lines that developers
 
seldom ventured out more than four blocks from the tracks.
 
Los Angeles' already low population density had little
 
opportunity to increase because the streetcar had made it
 
possible to avoid crowding by spreading outward. Until the
 
mid 1920s, the region around Los Angeles was a collection of
 
autonomous communities of single-family homes on large lots
 
with distinct separations between residential and business
 
districts. Although there were multiple business dis^
 
tricts in the region during the streetcar era, downtown Los
 
Angeles was the largest, and it dominated the region as long
 
as the trolleys were the primary means of transportation and
 
while their routes radiated out from downtown.^® This
 
dominance would change, however, as automobiles became more
 
popular, sprawling suburban settlement became standard, and
 
multiple business centers replaced the single dominating
 
central business district.
 
Fares, Jitneys and Private Automobiles
 
Although privately owned and operated, the Pacific
 
Electric and LARY were often considered and treated as
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public utilities. This disparity created problems whenever
 
the trolley companies appealed to the California Railroad
 
Commission (later the Public Utilities Commission) for a
 
fare increase. Lbs Angeles residents had long harbbred a
 
deep distrust toward railroads in general which was a result
 
of the Southern PabifiCs attempts in the 1870s to force the
 
city to turn over control of a local railroad and to pay the
 
Southern Pacific a $600,000 "subsidy" to build an SP line
 
into the otherwise isolated cityv^ The lingering distrust
 
of the motives of the railroads was evident in the public's
 
attitude toward them whenever a proposal for increased fares
 
was presented.
 
In spite of frequent requests for an increase, LARY's
 
fare remained at five cents from the earliest years of its
 
existence until 1926 when, after the Public Utilities Com
 
mission decided once again to deny a fare increase to adjust
 
for post-war inflation, LARY, won an appeal to the United
 
States Supreme Court for a two cent fare incfease.^'
 
The five cent fare had provided a good return for the
 
trolley companies' investors in the early years of the
 
century. Before World War I, fare increases were opposed
 
partly because it was assumed that operating expenses would
 
decrease over time because rail transportation was virtually
 
the only means of practical transportation available to the
 
. c' ■ ■ ■ , ■ ■ . 
public, and operating efficiencies would be realized as the
 
number of riders increased. But by 1914, LARY and the
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 PacifIg Electric began to experience competition from pri
 
vately owned automobiles as well as a new form of public
 
transportation, the "jitney." Initially, jitneys were
 
privately-owned automobiles which were used by their entre
 
preneurial owners to offer taxi-like services. By 1915 a
 
reported 1800 jitneys in the city carried 150,000 passengers
 
each day.^® Jitneys operated along the same routes as the
 
streetcars and had coitipetitive fares and better maneuver
 
ability (they were not dependent upon tracks).
 
They quickly became popular with the public because
 
they had several advantages over the streetcars: they could
 
flit in and out of traffic; and although they usually trav
 
eled along the same routes as the trolleys, they could, if
 
required, leave the standard route and deliver a passenger
 
directly to his own home; they had the same five cent fare
 
as the trolleys; and, finally, their popularity was enhanced
 
by the very novelty of the automobile.^® In addition to
 
filtering off a significant number of streetcar passengers,
 
when they first appeared on the streets of Los Angeles,
 
jitneys were an annoyance to LARY and the Pacific Electric
 
because they were unregulated and paid neither state nor
 
local taxes and only nominal business licensing fees. The
 
initial reasoning behind the lack of regulation was that the
 
city's Board of Public Utilities was willing to treat the
 
developing trade as an experiment in an alternate form of
 
transportation,®®
 
■ ' ' n . ■ / la­
Part of what inade the increased GompetitiQn from jit-^
 
neys and other automobiles so frustrating to LARY and th®
 
Pacific Electric, was that the traction companies were bound
 
by their franchise agreemehts to pave and maintain the
 
streets alohg which their linSs ran. They, then, provided
 
their competitioh with the vety means to compete, and the
 
more cohgested the streets became with automobile traffic,
 
the less efficiently the streetcars could operate. All of
 
this limited the traction companies* ability to earn what
 
they believed to be a fair return on their investment.
 
Late In 1914 the Pacific Electric and LARY appealed to
 
the city council to enact legislation to regulate the jit­
neys as public utilities. In March 1915, an ordinance was
 
passed which required jitney bperators to obtain a permit to
 
operate in a specific territory and route and to carry
 
insurance. The jitney operators protested by appealing for
 
relief from this regulation through a city-wide referendum,
 
but in the face of an organized opposition from the traction
 
companies and their employees, the challenge failed.^" Over
 
the next three yeairs, even more restrictive ordinances were
 
passed. In 1917, jitneys were barred from operating in the
 
central downtown business district in an effort to reduce
 
traffic congestion, and the final blow came during the
 
summer of 1918 when the Los Angeles Board of Utilities
 
voided all jitney licenses adjacent to trolley tracks. With
 
access to these popular routes denied, the jitney operators
 
could not sustain their business and jitney service disap
 
peared.
 
Although their services had been popular, the jitney
 
operators had not been:brganized enough to withstand the^ ^
 
objections of the traction companies. And while many pas
 
sengers had utilized the jitneys because they were dissatis
 
fied with streetcar services, public policy had turned
 
against jitneys only when it was determined that they did
 
not provide an efficient alternative to the trolleys. A
 
similar public policy induced scenario would unfold later
 
when the trolleys themselves fell out of fashion and favor.
 
Even as the jitneys faded from competition, the trolley
 
companies came to realize the more formidable challenge
 
posed by the personal automobile. In the first fifteen : : ;
 
years of the twentieth century, autos were primarily gadgets
 
owned by the wealthy. Interurban trolleys were still the
 
most efficient and popular means of travel for the working
 
class, but that was changing as automobiles became more
 
affordable and ownership more common.
 
The railway companies appealed to the California Public
 
Utilities Commission in 1919 for permission to institute a
 
fare increase to help recover increased operating costs
 
resulting from the effects of World War I. Labor shortages
 
had pushed up wages^^ and many of the commodities needed to
 
support operations had become scarce and expensive. By 1918
 
the operating cost ratio for LARY increased from sixty-nine
 
percent to eighty-three percent/ and both it and the PE were
 
showing a net income deficit.
 
In responding to the requests, the commission set a
 
precedent which played a fundamental role in the failure of
 
the trolley system in later years. It decided that an
 
increase was not in the public's best interests and denied
 
the fare increase recommending instead that the railways
 
find more efficient methods of operation. It suggested that
 
lines be rerouted and technology implemented in the form of
 
one-man operated safety cars instead of the two-man cars
 
commonly used. The commission determined that these cost
 
cutting measures would result in a $1.5 million savings
 
which, in turn, would cover expenses, fixed costs, and
 
finance the suggested capital improvements.^® It also
 
stipulated that only if the changes were implemented would
 
the commission consider a future fare increase. As much as
 
it needed the fare increase, the Pacific Electric could not
 
employ one-man cars because of existing labor union agree
 
ments. LARY did its best to meet the commission's demands,
 
but the savings generated by the changes were lost to infla
 
tion. It filed another request for an increase in 1921, but
 
the commission made approval of a one cent increase contin
 
gent upon the implementation of further cost savings mea
 
sures by the railway. LARY officials decided to forgo the
 
increase and to hope that better economic conditions would
 
return.^'
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The commission did make one concession to the trolleys
 
by requesting municipalities served by LARY and the Pacific
 
Electric to relieve the traction companies of their obliga
 
tions to pave the streets along their routes. The appeal
 
was largely ignored, however, as civic leaders realized that
 
their constituents' taxes would have to be raised in order
 
to maintain the roadS if the railroads were ho longer re
 
quired to provide the service. They decided to continue the
 
railways' obligations to pave rather than raise taxes on
 
residents within their districts.^®
 
Street Congestion
 
As early as 1910 there were reports of heavy street
 
traffic congestion in downtown Los Angeles. Automobiles
 
were becoming so popular that in 1914 the state of Califor
 
nia began tracking the number of registered automobiles
 
within the state. The congestion caused by automobile
 
traffic downtown severely impacted the efficiency of the
 
trolley lines because the trolleys did not haVe an exclusive
 
right-of-way on most of the intraurban lines arid had to
 
conterid with the same traffic as everybody else and had the
 
additiorial hiridrance of being tied to the rails. The
 
streetcars could riot move from lane to lane as horse-drawn
 
conveyances and later autos and buses could, and the slower
 
the trolleys got, the more passengers they lost.
 
The traction companies were caught in the middle of an
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impossible situation. On the one hand, they were facing
 
demands from the citizens of Los Angeles to improve effi
 
ciency and accommodations and to expand the area serviced.
 
On the other hand, they were barred by the CPtJC from in
 
creasing fares to finance improvements. When the railway
 
companies failed to respond to their demands, residents
 
complained to the CPUG, asking the agency to require the
 
traction companies to make the improvements. Utility com
 
missioners could not force the railways to make the changes
 
and even made matters worse by refusing to authorize in
 
creases without making them contingent on the implementation
 
of some other program with which the railways could not
 
comply. It is no wonder that residents began to find and
 
utilize alternative means of transportation:
 
The people gave up on the politicians and
 
took reform into their own hands by claiming
 
the right to their own private means of
 
transport. The automobile therefore became a
 
symbol of the democratic impulse that had
 
originally sparked the progressive move
 
ment.^®
 
Los Angeles city planners failed to recognize the
 
negative impact the automobile could have on transit within
 
the city until it was too late. They had estimated that the
 
number of automobiles in Los Angeles County would peak at
 
100,000: by 1924 there were more than 500,000." They also
 
failed to realize the positive effect that a well-organized,
 
publicly supported public transportation system could have.
 
During the same period that other American and European
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 metropolitan authorities were constructing publicly financed
 
subway and elevated intra- and interurban transit systems,
 
Los Angeles continually rejected proposals by LARY and the
 
Pacific Electric to finance improvements to the infrastruc
 
ture of their companies.
 
Heavy traffic congestion in downtown adversely affected
 
businesses as access to their premises was limited by avail
 
able parking. As the popularity of automobiles increased,
 
businesses began to move from the center of the city out to
 
developing suburban business districts. Between 1920 and
 
1924 the number of registered automobiles in Los Angeles
 
County increased from less than 200,000 to more than
 
500,000. By 1924 approximately 262,000 automobiles traveled
 
through downtown Los Angeles daily: the city's streets were
 
jammed. Streetcars, routed on the most heavily traveled
 
streets, were hampered by autos which refused to yield the
 
right-of-way and by unthinking pedestrians who constantly
 
crossed the streets in front of the moving streetcars.
 
Only once was serious consideration given to the pur
 
chase of LARY by the city when late in 1925 it opened nego
 
tiations with Henry Huntington to bring the intraurban line
 
under public ownership. Proponents of the idea pointed out
 
that the company could not afford capital improvements
 
without raising fares, but that under public ownership, some
 
of its expenses could be reduced through lower cost munici
 
pal bonds and the cessation of the paving requirements of
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 the franchise agreements and at the same time, the five cent
 
fare could be maintained. The Los Angeles Times ihitially
 
opposed the plan as socialistic, but its opppsition never
 
really caught oh as the city had already succeeded in
 
municipalizing its water, electricity and gas services.
 
In attempting to determine what a fair purchase price wbuld
 
be, the city failed to act quickly enough. Huntington died
 
in May 1927 and his estate went into probate. Negotiations
 
were never reopened as the plan's supporters lost inter
 
est,. '*'*■■ ■ 
Even though the trolleys offered reasonably efficient 
and inexpensive service, Los Angeles residents had chosen 
automobiles early and enthusiastically because they were 
comfortable, private, and they could go just about anywhere 
the driver wantbd to go. When compared to the national 
average, Los Angeles far exceeded other cities in the number 
of cars per resident; as early as 1915 the national mean was 
one car per forty-three residents while Los Angeles had one 
for every eight.'*® By 1925, the ratio of cars to people 
nationally was 1:6, but in Los Angeles it was 1:2.*® 
Table 2 helps to illustrate just how much more dependent Los 
Angeles residents were on automobiles than the average 
American by comparing the number of residents per automobile 
in the United States, Chicago and Los Angeles. 
Just as the streetcar had contributed to the region's 
dispersed nature of settlement, the automobile had its own 
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TABLE 2 .
 
Residents Per Automobile
 
United States Los Angeles Chicago
 
1915 . . . . 43.1 8.2 61,0
 
1920 . . . . 13.1 3.6 30.0
 
1925 . . . . 6.6 1.8 11.0
 
1930 . . . . 5.3 ■ 1.5 8.0 
1935 . . . . 5.6 NA
■ 1-6
 
1940 . . . . 4.8 ■ ■ ' 'v'- . 1.4 ■ ■ NA
 
Source:Scott L. Bottles ^ Los Anaeles and the Automobile
 
(Los Angeles, The University of California Press, 1987),
 
,93'.
 
effect on the spatial development of the region by making it
 
possible to fill in the spaces between radiating railroad
 
lines which had previously been inconvenient to settle. It
 
also increased the accessibility to those area^ where
 
streetcars had never reached. With increased usage, automo
 
bile drivers demanded more and better roads and highways.
 
Their demands generated a change in public transportation
 
policy whereby public agencies began using tax dollars to
 
construct and maintain roadways rather than waiting for
 
private enterprise to provide.^'
 
The provision of better roads further affected the
 
operating efficiency of LARY and the Pacific EleCtfic. Once
 
protected right-of-ways were violated by roads crossing the
 
tracks at grade level and over which motorists would some­
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times race the trolley or just assume the right-of-way. The
 
increase in cross traffic on formerly protected or rural
 
routes meant that the motormen operating the trolleys needed
 
to slow their traveling speed in order to avoid the possi
 
bility of collisions. While there were some instances of
 
cooperation between the railroads and public entities to
 
build over- and undercrossings, there were too few of them
 
built and too many automobiles to positively affect the
 
streetcars' operations.
 
A telling example of the sacrifice of the interurban in
 
favor of the automobile Was the demand by the motoring
 
public to pave around the rails of the Long Beach line. i?he
 
line had been constructed in 1902 with a protected right-of­
way and included separate public roadways on either side of
 
the tracks which allowed the Pacific Electric to travel at
 
its highest possible speed and efficiency. In the 1920s,
 
however, the public demanded a change, and although the PE
 
argued that its efficiency would be deeply and negatively
 
affected, the right-of-way was eliminated and pavement laid
 
around the tracks. The result, a wide boulevaird, increased
 
accessibility and movement for automobiles, but it also
 
increased the traveling time for Pacific Electric riders by
 
about thirty percent which prompted many passengers to
 
abandon the Red Cars in favor of their own automobiles.^®
 
In the 1920s the interurban began to face competition
 
from privately and municipaliy owned motorbuses. Like the
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jitneys which preceded them, the buses tended to travel the
 
same routes as the streetcars because they were the most
 
heavily traveled. Instead of supplementing and enhancing
 
the Pacific Electric's and LARY's services by operating
 
within areas where the streetcars could not reach, the buses
 
offered direct competition to the streetcars. The continued
 
lack of efficiency encouraged trolley passengers to use
 
other forms of transportation and further reduced the trac
 
tion companies' revenues.^® The Public Utilities Commission
 
could do nothing for the traction companies to control the
 
competition from buses because the buses were out of the
 
commission's jurisdiction.
 
Although the streetcar companies had successfully
 
challenged competition from the jitney trade in the previous
 
decade, buses posed a more difficult challenge because they
 
operated in a wider area than the jitneys had. Jitneys had
 
operated almost exclusively within the city of Los Angeles
 
and, for the most part, were independently owned and oper
 
ated. Buses, on the other hand, were either municipally
 
owned and operated within the confines of the communities
 
for which they were purchased, or were independently owned
 
and operated between the various communities. There was no
 
single entity to which the traction companies could appeal
 
to receive relief from competitive pressures. Furthermore,
 
the Los Angeles City Council had imposed regulations upon
 
the jitney trade because jitneys were adding undesirable
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traffic to downtown streets, buses were apparently not
 
having the same effect.50
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UNION STATION CONTROVERSY
 
Traffic in downtown Los Angeles had emerged as a major
 
planning problem by the first half of the 1920s. Most of
 
the streets had been laid out during an era when horse drawn
 
wagons and the trolleys had easily shared the space. With
 
rapid population growth and the introduction of large num
 
bers of automobiles, the streets were not able to accommo
 
date the resulting volume of congestion. Neither automo
 
biles nor streetcars could negotiate the streets at a con
 
sistent pace and parking had become almost impossible. The
 
streetcar system was severely impacted and "slowly dying of
 
congestion."®^
 
Rather than encouraging the use of the potentially more
 
efficient public transportation system, the Los Angeles
 
County Board of Supervisors decided that the use of downtown
 
streets needed to be limited to automobile traffic. In 1923
 
it set up a regional planning commission charged with devel
 
oping an integrated countywide highway system. In 1924
 
voters elected to establish what was called the "Major
 
Traffic Street Plan" which, when completed, was to include
 
recommendations for widening streets and otherwise enhancing
 
the movement of traffic through the city's streets.®^
 
Although downtown businessmen did not want to admit it,
 
there was a shift developing in which downtown Los Angeles
 
was fading as the dominant central business district and
 
being replaced by smaller business districts throughout the
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region. Between 1923 and 1931 the number of people entering
 
downtown Los Angeles fell by twenty-four percent despite a
 
general population increase in the metropolitan area." The
 
Pacific Electric was not equipped to accommodate this change
 
because its services operated out of a central hub located
 
in downtown and could not proyide direct service between
 
ma:ny of the communities which were located on separate
 
radials.
 
Huntington's Pacific Electric had cbhtributed much to
 
population dispersal in the Los Angeles area, and it was its
 
sprawling nature that made the Pa;cific Electric's chief
 
competitor, the automobile, so popular. Initially, people
 
had moved to the suburbs located along the PE's tracks.
 
However, as automobile ownership became common, developers
 
were able to construct homes which were far from existing PE
 
lines but which were easily accessible to automobiles.
 
Another of the many problems that affected the effi
 
ciency of the streetcars within the city was that they
 
almost always shared the street with other vehicles and
 
pedestrians. Automobiles routinely traveled on the street
 
car tracks and obstructed the movement of the trolleys.
 
Pedestrians frequently crossed in front of moving trolleys
 
slowing already sluggish progress. Streetcar passengers
 
became frustrated with the uncomfprtable and decaying condi
 
tions of aging trolley cars, and many eventually stopped
 
riding them in favor of their own automobiles in which, at
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minimum, they could travel at the same speed the trolleys
 
did but in greater comfort.
 
By the mid twenties, enterprising businessmen recog
 
nized that downtown Los Angeles was crowded and inconyenient
 
to shoppers and moved all or part of their businesses out of
 
the downtown area to outlying commercial centers. Bull
 
ock's Wilshire, for example, opened its doors in 1928 a few
 
miles west of downtown. It immediately demonstrated that it
 
possessed a distinct advantage for motorists over downtown
 
stores because it provided a large parking lot right next to
 
the store for the cohvenience of its shoppers."
 
In 1924 the Los Angeles City Council appointed the firm
 
of Kelker, De Leuw & Company to develop a rapid transit plan
 
for the city. Known as the Kelker-De Leuw Report, the
 
firm's conclusions were submitted to the city in 1925. The
 
report advised that a reduction in downtown congestion could
 
be achieved by segregating streetcar traffic from automobile
 
traffic by creating rapid transit lines with protected
 
right-of-ways via elevated tracks, subway routes, and lim
 
ited stops. This would provide speedy and efficient trans
 
portation to downtown from outlying communities as well as
 
improved automobile traffic flow on the city's street. The
 
report also acknowledged the continuing importance of
 
streetcars and interurbans to other communities in the
 
region as a part of an integrated system.
 
Perhaps because it had been commissioned by the city,
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 the Kelker-De Leuw Report's primary flaw was that it assumed
 
the continuing importance of downtown Los Angeles as a
 
destination, but the automobile had already made this as
 
sumption obsolete. It had become much more convenient and
 
common for shoppers to frequent the stores and other busi
 
nesses which were springing up on the periphery of the city
 
and in its surrounding communities. In addition to the
 
convenience of doing business locally rather than downtown,
 
the idea of small, autonomous communities appealed to thOse
 
who had cOme to Galifornia to escape the densely populated
 
cities of the east in pursuit of a healthy; uncrowded life
 
style. These people were not interested in fuhding a rapid
 
transit plan which did not satisfy their own interpretation
 
of the Southern California lifestyle."
 
One of the more important features of the Kelker-De
 
Leuw Report as it related to the trolleys, was that it
 
warned that a healthy rapid transit system could not be
 
self-supporting in an area of low population density and
 
that public subsidization was essential to its success in
 
Los Angeles. It cited New York, Boston and Philadelphia, as
 
examples of cities which had provided public funding for
 
their rapid transit plans and had achieved their objectives.
 
Only with some form of public funding, the report argued,
 
could fares be kept reasonable and serve as wide an area as
 
required.
 
Soon after the report was presented, a Citizens' Rapid
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Transit Committee was formed to study and implement the
 
report's recommendations. Committee members included repre
 
sentatives from various civic organizations, the Pacific
 
Electric and Los Angeles Railway, members of the city coun
 
cil and other city officials.®® During this review period,
 
opposition quickly formed because of the Los Angeles Times'
 
focus on Kelker-De Leuw's recommendation to construct ele
 
vated right-of-ways for the trolleys. The opening of the
 
rapid transit issue also regenerated interest in the con
 
struction of a hew centralized train station for the city
 
which would eliminate the separate stations currently in use
 
by Southern Pacific, Santa Fe and Union Pacific and provide
 
access for passengers wanting to transfer to Pacific Elec
 
tric trains. In 1925, the city council endorsed a plan to
 
establish just such a terminal at the "Plaza" site a few
 
blocks from the new city hall building, parallel to the
 
banks of the Los Angeles River. The question of building a
 
union station and, if built, whether it should be located at
 
the Plaza site was put on an April 1926 ballot.
 
The railroads, not wanting the expense of building a
 
new station, submitted a plan of their own. They offered to
 
build elevated lines to the Pacific Electric terminal build
 
ing and protected walkways for travelers to use when moving
 
between the various stations.
 
Although it would not be required to move its opera
 
tions to the proposed union station, the Pacific Electric
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would be affected by the change. The plan did airow for the
 
future possibility of constructing a subway access to the
 
station for the PE, but in the meantime, service to the new
 
station would have to be provided via additional surface
 
grade crossings. The Los Anaeles Times reported that Pa
 
cific Electric officials had informed the Public Utilities
 
Commission that if the Plaza plan were implemented, it would
 
probably have to move its main line operation to the east
 
side Of the Los Angeles River to escape the worst of down
 
town congestion.^®
 
The railroads' proposal was opposed by the public in
 
general and by Harry Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles
 
Times, in particular. Chandler used the newspaper to wage a
 
campaign against the railroads by focusing on two key is
 
sues: the inconvenience to travelers of the railroads'
 
multistation system and the proposed introduction of ele
 
vated lines in the city. In the weeks prior to the elec
 
tion, the Times ran numerous frbnt page articles about
 
elevated lines in cities on the east coast emphasizing their
 
negative aspects such as the noise, how they darkened the
 
streets over Which they ran, and how difficult they were to
 
access when accidents occurred. Accompanying the articles
 
were photographs depicting long, dark blocks of streets
 
overshadowed by elevated tracks. The day before the elec
 
tion, the railroads and their supporters placed a three-

quarters page ad in the Times which included a statement
 
signed by the presidents of the four railroads which de
 
clared that elevated lines in Los Angeles meant altered
 
grade crossings such as under- and overcrossings, not miles
 
of trestles raised to run longitudinally over the streets of
 
Los Angeles as the Times had implied.®" The voters cast
 
their ballots in favor of the union station and the Plaza
 
site plans.
 
Although it was not immediately apparent, the election
 
had at least two damaging long term effects on the Pacific
 
Electric's future: first, the Kelker-De Leuw Report's
 
recommendation for public subsidization of rapid transit had
 
been buried and all but forgotten in the station contro
 
versy; and second, the failure of the plan for elevated
 
lines dashed its chances of being able to compete success
 
fully against the automobile. Without the elevated lines
 
and subways, the Pacific Electric could not reasonably
 
improve its operational efficiency because it simply could
 
not move its cars efficiently through the city's traffic
 
entanglements.
 
The Kelker-De Leuw Report had anticipated correctly
 
what would happen if the streetcar companies were not pub
 
licly subsidized. The report had indicated that a streetcar
 
system could either be privately funded and provide quality,
 
limited service with high fares or it could be publicly
 
funded and provide extensive service with reasonable fares.
 
The Los Angeles streetcar companies could accomplish neither
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because they could not raise their fares without the ap
 
proval of the Public Utilities Commission which, despite
 
numerous requests, had not authorized an increase in years.
 
Furthermore, without public subsidies, it became increas
 
ingly difficult for the traction companies to service their
 
current lines even as area residents continued to criticize
 
the PE for not expanding into newly developed areas.
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THE GREAT DEPRESSION
 
The Great Depression dealt the trolley system a severe
 
financial blow. Patronage fell sharply and the Pacific
 
Electric's operating revenues fell to a twenty year low
 
while the L.A. Railway's reached a ten year low.®^ Between
 
1931 and 1949 the PE suffered average losses of two million
 
dollars per year, and while not as great, LARY also posted
 
losses during the Depression years. The deficits made it
 
increasingly difficult for the companies to make capital
 
improvements and even to maintain existing lines properly.
 
While LARY had been granted a two cent fare increase in
 
1927, it used the increased revenues to improve its balance
 
sheet instead of rolling them back into the business by
 
making capital improvements and upgrading customer services.
 
The Pacific Electric had also requested a fare increase at
 
the same time but was denied based on the CPUC's determina
 
tion that higher fares would lead to losses in ridership.
 
The commission actually recommended that the PE reduce its
 
fa:res on one of its routes in order to encourage new riders.
 
The PE complied and when this failed to generate the hoped
 
for increase in ridership the commission relented and per
 
mitted the fare increase. Unfortunately, this time the
 
commission's predictions were realized as both patronage and
 
revenues fell after the fares were raised. Both LARY and
 
the Pacific Electric decided that it was necessary to close
 
unprofitable lines. The commission agreed with the traction
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companies* decision and authorized the closing and disman
 
tling of many lines in the late 1920s and through the
 
1930s.
 
Neither the Pacific Electric nor LARY had the financial
 
reserves necessary to dO more than survive the Depression
 
although the Pacific Electric had the advantage of the
 
Southern Pacific's financial backing. The infrastructure of
 
both companies suffered as rolling stock and rails aged.
 
Even as services were reduced or suspended on lightly trav
 
eled lines, the public never fully understood the problems
 
the traction companies faced and continued to lodge com
 
plaints about the lack of crosstown lines and other ser­
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Vices.
 
Although it might have seemed practical during this
 
period of economic distress for people to abandon their
 
automobiles and turn to the more cost-efficient public
 
transportation system, this did not happen. The automobile
 
had become a necessity rather than a luxury by this time,
 
and while annual car sales fell seventy-five percent between
 
1929 and 1932, car registrations fell only ten percent which
 
indicates that while people were willing to delay the pur
 
chase of a new vehicle, they were not as receptive to the
 
idea of giving up the one they already owned.®®
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DECLINING OPERATIONS
 
Throughout the 1930s the Pacific Electric terminated
 
service on unprofitable lines. Each time services con
 
tracted, the company lost more passengers and was criticized
 
for not attempting to attract business by putting new cars
 
into service or by expanding into new communities. The
 
public apparently could not comprehend the idea that a
 
railrdad company did not have the funds to finance expansion
 
projects. Worse, the Public Utilities Commission compounded
 
the problem by consistently siding with public by refusing
 
to authorize fare increases which, over time, could have
 
financed expansion and other improvement projects.
 
Most people seemed to have lost interest in the trol
 
leys as an important factor in the regional transportation
 
system. Periodically downtown advocates and city officials
 
formed committees to investigate the rapid transit plan, but
 
whenever the guestion of financing the implementation arose,
 
proposals which included public bond measures or increased
 
property assessments were rejected. There was a general
 
distrust toward the idea of rapid transit which stemmed from
 
a resentment toward downtown advocates by those living in
 
surrounding communities. There was also an assumption by
 
the public that rail-based transportation was within the
 
realm of private enterprise and that any changes to it be
 
privately financed even though the trolleys were regulated
 
by a public agency that illogically and regularly denied
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them the ability to charge a fair price for their services.
 
Between the competing priorities and assumptions of the
 
public, the rapid rail transit plans were always put aside
 
and the trolley companies were virtually powerless to im
 
prove their situation.
 
World War TI provided a temporary resurgence of popu
 
larity for the streetcar system when gasoline and rubber
 
shortages made it difficult for people to operate their
 
private automobiles. The streetcars were put into extremely
 
heavy use during the war. In addition to regular passenger
 
traffic, they were used to transport large groups of sol
 
diers and sailors from the trains at Union Station to their
 
bases and other duty posts in the Southland.®® The Pacific
 
Electric experienced so large an increase in the number of
 
passengers that it had to take its old wooden cars out of
 
storage and borrow additional rolling stock from other
 
cities in order to meet demand.®' Soon after the end of the
 
war, however, residents returned to their old habits and the
 
convenience of their personal automobiles.
 
In 1946, the Pacific Electric requested approval for
 
its first post-war fare increase to cover rising operating
 
costs. The Public Utilities Commission granted the request,
 
but it also ordered the company to upgrade its equipment
 
before any additional requestis would be approved.®® While
 
the company would have liked to follow the directive, it
 
still did not have the financial reserves necessary to
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finance an upgrade. The fare increase merely kept it in
 
operation.
 
The Pacific Electric made its final attempt to maintain
 
a position as a viable transportation alternative in 1947
 
when it tried to obtain city and state funds to finance the
 
construction of a right-of-way for the Pacific Electric down
 
the center of the new Hollywood Freeway which was still in
 
the planning stage. The PE's president, Oscar Smith, be
 
lieved that, if successful, a double-tracked line running
 
down this freeway would serve as a model for future coopera
 
tive projects. He estimated that the railway could trans
 
port twice as many people per hour along its right-of-way as
 
the eight lanes of automobile traffic. In spite of its
 
obvious utility, the proposal was rejected as too costly
 
both in terms of money and time because it was determined
 
that construction on the freeway would have to be delayed in
 
order to introduce the rail lines into the project.®®
 
In response to the directive to upgrade from the CPUC
 
and the failure of the Hollywood Freeway proposal. Pacific
 
Electric officials began to seriously evaluate their posi
 
tion in the passenger rail service market. Even before the
 
war, its rolling stock was outdated and worn because the
 
company had not had the funds to make improvements. During
 
the war, the continuous, heavy usage had almost worn out the
 
trolley cars, but the company could not update the equipment
 
because of materials shortages caused by the war. As soon
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as the war was over, ridership had fallen off again and
 
company officials recognized that there was little prospect
 
for improvement in the future. The Pacific Electric made
 
the decision in 1953 to sell its passenger operations to
 
Metropolitan Goach Lines, a bus service provider in the
 
Southern California region. Metropolitan operated the
 
Pacific Electric at a loss for five years before it sold the
 
system to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority
 
(LAMTA), a state-owned agency, which oversaw the actual
 
demise of the interurban after it announced the suspension
 
of passenger trolley service in 1961.'*'
 
LARY experienced a similar fate. In 1940 it had begun
 
making arrangements to convert from a fixed rail service to
 
a motorbus service. Company officials believed this change
 
would position the company to take advantage of the next
 
phase of intraurban mass transit. Before the buses could be
 
purchased, however. World War II broke out and modernization
 
plans had to be put on hold, and then in 1944 the Huntington
 
estate sold LARY to American City Lines, a subsidiary of
 
National City Lines which owned transit systems nationwide.
 
American City Lines changed LARY's name to American Transit
 
Lines and implemented the modernization plans set forth by
 
LARY in 1940, completing the transformation of the company
 
from a streetcar line to bus service before the company was
 
sold again to LAMTA ih 1958.^^
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THE CONSPIRACY THEORY
 
As streetcar companies across the nation were sold and
 
their operations converted to bus service, there arose a
 
popular belief that a group of auto, rubber, and oil compa
 
nies had conspired over the yeats to remove trolleys from
 
competition in the transportation industry. There is little
 
evidence of the existence of an actual conspiracy. If,
 
however, one is inclined to distrust the business practices
 
of large corporations, then the theory is appealing, but it
 
does not withstand cortiparison to the facts of the situation
 
in the Los Angeles region.
 
The conspiracy theory argues that streetcar Systems
 
were sold and converted to motorbus service nationwide
 
beginning in the 1920s and through the early 1960s, but it
 
is also true, but infrequently mentioned, that the Pacific
 
Electric and LARY had been using buses to augment their rail
 
service since the early 192Os'^ and LARY had planned to
 
modernize its operations with buses before World War II. It
 
is also true that many of the nations' streetcar companies
 
were purchased by National City Lines (NCL) which was a
 
subsidiary of General Motors, and that National City Lines
 
purchased GM buses to operate in its franchises. What is
 
largely ignored, however, is the fact that when NCL pur
 
chased many of these lines nationwide, the trolleys were
 
often in deep financial distress because of a declining
 
market: this was the case in Los Angeles. National City
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Lines was not organized until 1936 and did not have any
 
connection with LARY or the Pacific Electric until the late
 
1940s.: .
 
As this examination has shown, the Pacific Electric
 
experienced decades of financial troubles before it decided
 
to give up on passenger service. There had beeh frequent
 
opportunities available for the public to fund or otherwise
 
subsidize improvements and expansion of the streetcar ser
 
vices, but these were consistently rejected for various
 
reasons: short-sighted fare decisions made by the Public
 
Utilities Commission; a general public objection to fund
 
privately owned companies; and a long-standing struggle
 
between the downtown advocates and those who preferred
 
decentralization and viewed rapid transit as a ploy by
 
downtown to increase its importance at the expense of outly
 
ing communities.
 
In 1974 Bradford C. Snell gained widespread recognition
 
when he presented a report entitled "American Ground Trans
 
port" to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
 
and Monopoly of the Committee oh the Judiciary. In this
 
report, he attempted to explain how General Motors, Ford and
 
Chrysler "eliminated competition among themselves, secured
 
control over rival bus and rail industries, and then maxi
 
mized profits by substituting cars and trucks for trains,
 
streetcars, subways and buses.
 
He reported that in the mid-twenties, GM needed to
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secure a new market for itself beqause the private automo
 
bile industry had become saturated. To that end, GM pur
 
chased Yellow Coach Lines in 1925 and began production of
 
motor buses. In 1925, it was involved in the formation of
 
Greyhound Corporation which, according to Snell, had as its
 
purpose the conversion of passenger rail services to inter^
 
city bus service. In 1932, GM "undertook the direct opera
 
tion and conversion of interurban railways and local elec
 
tric streetcar and trolleybus systems to city bus opera
 
tions."'^ Snell further contended that it was GM's ultimate
 
inteht to replace buses with automobiles by making buses so
 
inconvenient and uncomfortable that passengers would abandon
 
them in favor of private cars.'®
 
Snell explained that GM formed United Cities Motor
 
Transit (UCMT) specifically to purchase and convert street
 
car systems to bus service. UCMT was successful in several
 
cities where it established a pattern of purchasing the
 
streetqar line, converting its services to bus service, then
 
reselling the company before moving on to the next city.
 
UCMT and GM were censured in 1935 by the American Transit
 
Association (ATA) for similui^ activities in Portland in
 
which GM as a bus manufacturer was deemed to be self-serv
 
ing. As a result of the ATA criticism, UCMT Was dissolved.
 
In the next year, however, Snell argued that three GM and
 
several Greyhound executives formed National City Lines to
 
perform the same service that UCMT had.'® The idea of an
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interindustry conspiracy emerged because GM and Firestone
 
Rubber and Tire owned stock in NGL and Standard Oil of
 
California, Mack Truck, and Phillips Petroleum owned stock
 
in NCL's subsidiary, American city Lines. National City
 
Lines had agreements with all of these companies to purchase
 
their products to fill its equipment and supply needs.
 
Between 1936 and 1949 more than one hundred electric transit
 
systems in forty-five cities had been purchased and con
 
verted to GM buses.
 
While the facts of the above situation are true,
 
Snell's accusations that the actions of all of the compa
 
nies, but GM in particular, were performed with the specific
 
intent to destroy passenger rail service ignores the possi
 
bility that GM did what all good businesses do by recogniz
 
ing a need in the marketplace and devising a means to fill
 
that need while earning a profit from it at the same time.
 
Snell assumes, incorrectly, that all of the trolley systems
 
that NCL and its subsidiaries purchased were healthy con
 
cerns which had years of usefulness and profit ahead of them
 
and which also had no choice in the matter of their sales.
 
He and others Who favor the conspiracy theory fail to ac
 
knowledge that in some cases, people had already stopped
 
using the streeitcars in favor of their personal automobiles
 
long before UCMT or NCL Were even thought of. In Los An
 
geles this trend had been apparent since the mid 1920s and
 
yet the Southern Pacific maintained its ownership of the
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Pacific Electric until 1948 when it decided that its profit
 
potential had been lost.
 
Snell's arguments also fail to include recognition of
 
the effects of local public policy on the ability of street
 
car systems to survive. In cities where municipalization of
 
transit systems took place when the issue was popular
 
amongst the citizens, the systems tended to decline less
 
than they did elsewhere.'' In other words, where the public
 
agreed there was value to rail-based passenger service, that
 
service remained in operation. Wherever the service was
 
assigned little overall value, it disappeared. In Los
 
Angeles, municipalization had not occurred because the city
 
had acted too slowly in the negotiations to purchase LARY
 
when it had the chance between 1925 and 1927, and because by
 
the time the city was prepared to consider the idea seri
 
ously, rail-based rapid transit had already lost much of its
 
significance. There was little real need to keep the trol
 
leys going because the automobile provided a viable, seem
 
ingly efficient, and comfortable alternative form of trans
 
portation.
 
In Los Angeles, people had turned away from the street
 
cars long before NCL came into town. Automobiles were
 
consistently given priority over other means of transporta
 
tion because residents wanted it that way. They approved
 
projects which removed the streetcars' right-of-ways, which
 
allowed grade crossings on formerly high speed interurban
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tracks, widened streets and improved traffic flow, financed
 
freeway construction with public funds, and provided free
 
ways with the protected right-of-ways which had been denied
 
to the Pacific Electric for years. They also repeatedly
 
refused to fund improvements on the streetcar lines by
 
failing to support fare increase requests. It is then fair
 
to state that, at least in Los Angeles, GM was not responsi
 
ble for the death of the streetcar system, and that in fact,
 
it was actually the public through its repeated demonstra
 
tion of a preference for the automobile and the California
 
Public Utilities Commission with its short-sighted decisions
 
which made it virtually impossible for the trolleys to
 
survive, much less compete, against the automobile.
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EPILOGUE
 
After decades of massive freeway construction designed
 
to relieve traffic congestion and in an effort to reduce
 
smog emissions, Los Angeles and its environs turned once
 
again to the idea of rail-based commuter service in the
 
early 1990s when it launched a new light rail trolley system
 
to serve the area.
 
Ironically, the first new trolley line to be put into
 
service in July, 1990 was the Blue Line which closely fol
 
lows the Pacific Electric's old Long Beach line. Since the
 
Blue line opened, the system has grown rapidly and combines
 
electric powered light rail trolleys and subways that within
 
Los Angeles are collectively known as Metrorail with a
 
regional network of diesel powered trains known as Metrolink
 
which serve communities outside the immediate vicinity of
 
Los Angeles.
 
The Blue Line initially offered trains at ten-minute
 
intervals during peak commuting periods and at 15 minute
 
intervals at other times. The initial fare was set at $1.10
 
per one-way trip, the same as bus fare.'® While transit
 
officials were concerned that the fares might be too high,
 
they are heavily subsidized. In the first year of its
 
operation, the Blue Line was expected to bring in only about
 
five percent of its operating budget through fares. In
 
contrast, the Rapid Transit District's (RTD) buses typically
 
returned approximately forty percent of their operating
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budget through fares.'® Aftfer two years of operation,
 
however, the Blue Line was receiving about thirteen percent
 
of its operating budget from fares which was a much better
 
return than anticipated.®®
 
The attitude toward funding rapid rail transit changed
 
drastically between the time the Pacific Electric went out
 
of business and the inauguration of Metrorail's service.
 
The public is currently fiscally and politically supportive
 
of the rail-based system and has voted in favor of increased
 
sales and gasoline taxes, approved bond measures and sup
 
ported lobbying for federal funding.®^
 
While Metrorail has been successful in attracting
 
riders, a survey done in 1992 during the second year of the
 
Blue Line's operation showed that sixty-four percent of its
 
passengers had previously taken the bus as their primary
 
form of commuter transportation. By switching from bus to
 
rail, they were actually utilizing a more expensive form of
 
transportation than the one they had used before. The
 
survey also showed that thirty-six percent of the riders had
 
previously used their cars. At the time the survey was
 
taken, it was estimated that 35,600 people rode the Blue
 
Line each weekday and that about 5,800 cars were kept off
 
the freeways each day.®^ Metrolink proved even more suc
 
cessful at attracting commuters out of their autos and onto
 
the trains. A 1993 survey of Metrolink riders showed that
 
sixty-five percent of its riders had formerly commuted alone
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in their private automobiles which translated into remoying
 
approximately 16,000 cars each week from the region's free
 
ways. About half of those surveyed rated Metrolink as a
 
better value than commuting by auto even though they be
 
lieved that it cost them more out of pocket than driving
 
did.®^
 
Other than the old right-of-ways and that it is rail-

based, the current system of rapid rail transit bears little
 
resemblance to the old Pacific Electric and LARY systems.
 
Because it is publicly owned and operated this system has a
 
better chance for survival as it does not have to compete
 
with the automobile directly as its predecessors did. It
 
will also be protected from competitive pressures until the
 
priorities of the voting public shift again.
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APPENDIX A: SYMBOL OF LOS ANGELES
 
Over the years the Pacific Electric's cars became so
 
widely known that they came to represent Southern California
 
symbolically in popular culture. Merely showing them in the
 
round of a movie or mentioning them in descriptiYe
 
passages of a novel helped to establish a scene in the Los
 
Angeles area. People might not consciously realize that a
 
trolley car had appeared on the screen because the street­
cars were such an integral part of Los Angeles life that
 
they did not need to be emphasized but could be accepted as
 
i
 
a sutjtle confirmation of location; just as one would not
 
have to explain a visual reference to the subway in a story
 
set i|n New York City or the cable cars in san FrancisGo, one
 
did not need to explain the appearance of the Big Red Cars
 
in Los Angeles.
 
In "Singin' in the Rain," the 1952 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
 
musical set in the late 1920s, the main character is a
 
silent screen actor who finds it necessary to flee a horde
 
of adoring fans after the premiere of his latest film. The
 
only laVailable means of escape is to leap atop a passing
 
Pacific Electric Railway car. He runs along the top of the
 
trolley as it moves down the Hollywood street, then jumps
 
into a passing convertible automobile. The trolley contin
 
ues on its way in the opposite direction.
 
Raymond Chandler referred to the streetcars casually in
 
his hoyels about the darker side of Los Angeles. In 1939•s
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The Big Sleep/ he describes the backgrouhd as the character,
 
Philip Marlow, begins an investigation:
 
I finished my cigarette and lit another. The
 
minutes dragged by. Horns tooted and grunted
 
on the boulevard. A big red interurban car
 
grumbled past. A traffic light gohged. The
 
blonde leaned on her elbow and cupped a hand
 
over her eyes and stared at me behind
 
it. .
 
In Farewell, My Lovely, another Chandler novel, the author
 
sets the scene in the Los Angeles detective's office by
 
briefly referring to the interurban:
 
A wedge of sunlight slipped over the edge of
 
the desk and fell noiselessly to the carpet.
 
Traffic lights bong-bonged outside on the
 
boulevard, interurban cars pounded by, a
 
typewriter clacked monotonously in the law
 
yer's office beyond the party wall. I had
 
filled and lit a pipe when the telephone rang
 
again.®®
 
While the Pacific Electric disappeared from the land
 
scape more than thirty years ago, contemporary authors
 
continue to use references to the system to set their sto
 
ries in time. Stuart M. Kaminsky, a mystery writer, often
 
places his characters in Los Angeles during the forties and
 
fifties. In one book. Buried Caesars, the main character
 
unexpectedly finds himself on the San Marino estate of Henry
 
Huntington. Although Huntington had died years before the
 
character stumbles onto the estate, Kaminsky takes the time
 
to explain Huntington's significance as it related to the
 
character's experience:
 
Old man Huntington had put together the Pa
 
cific Electric Streetcar System, the big red
 
cars and the yellow cars, the . . . trollies
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 with the overhead cables that you cbuld
 
ride through the canyons for a dime.
 
"The world's wonderland lines," he
 
called it, and at its peak Huntington's
 
Pacific Electric carried more passengers
 
every day than the transit systems of
 
the five biggest cities combined.®® /
 
In another of Kaminsky's books. The Fala Factor, a
 
character makes a passing reference to attending an impor
 
tant meeting "with some folks at Pacific Electric Rail
 
way."®^ Although all of these examples include only a very
 
brief reference, they are sufficient to demonstrate how much
 
a part of everyday life the Pacific Electric played. It is
 
an entity which readers can identify without much explana
 
tion. The reference becomes part of the story without
 
causing interference.
 
The Disney movie, "Who Framed Roger Rabbit?", actually
 
introduces a form of the conspiracy theory of the demise of
 
the Red Care as a significant subplot. The villain of the
 
piece, Judge Doom, buys the Red Cars specifically so that he
 
can remove them from service. With the trolley out of the
 
way, people would be forced to use their automobiles on the
 
sbon to be built freeways which would, in turn, create a
 
paradise in which automobiles would generate demand for
 
innumerable roadside businesses such as gasoline stations,
 
garages, and fast food restaurants. Judge Doom's vision
 
seemed unrealistic to the hero, Eddie Valiant, who did not
 
own an automobile and could not imagine the city without the
 
Red Cars. In the end. Valiant thwarted Judge Doom's efforts
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to control Toon Town and his intention to resell it when the
 
freeway cut through.
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